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A B S T R A C T
The European Parliament (EP) possesses a highly special-
ized committee system, operating in a complex institutional
and political environment, yet little empirical work has inves-
tigated how MEPs are assigned to EP committees and what
consequences this process has for representation and
policy-making. In this article I examine the growth of EP
committees and committee membership since 1979, and
address the question of whether these committees are repre-
sentative of the EP as a whole. Using an original data set of
committee membership, national and EP party affiliation,
MEP characteristics, and MEP policy preferences derived
from roll-call votes, I address three key questions: Does
committee membership reflect the party group composition
of the EP? Do committee members possess specialized
expertise in their committees’ policy areas? And, finally, do
committee members’ general or committee-specific policy
preferences differ substantially from those of the overall
Parliament? The results suggest very strongly that, although
committee members do tend to possess policy-specific
expertise, committees are, nonetheless, highly representa-
tive of the EP as a whole, in terms of both party and policy
representation.
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In the early years of the Parliament there was the institutional imperative but now
many of these demands have been met. . . . The debate is [now] less institutional
and much more about policy content. . . . The institutional agenda has been
achieved, policy matters much more. It is an entirely new environment since
Maastricht and now it is much more of an issue if a committee is off-centre.
(Former MEP, George Ben Patterson)1
Introduction
Committees form the backbone of most modern legislatures, screening,
drafting, amending and even, in some cases, approving legislation. The
question of how committee systems form and how parties fill them with
members has great importance for the process of policy-making and passing
laws (Shepsle, 1978; Mattson and Strøm, 1995; Longley and Davidson, 1998).
Parliaments are often large and unwieldy bodies and increasingly function
effectively only by delegating important policy-making tasks to specialized
committees. Consequently, the subject of how committee specialization
occurs and how committee members are chosen has generated a huge
volume of academic study (Groseclose, 1994; Krehbiel, 1991; Londregan and
Snyder, 1994). A key question in committee studies is whether committees
are representative of the legislatures they serve. Despite the clear advantages
that division of labour and gains from specialization bring to an assembly,
there are risks involved in this delegation process. Committees may not
always act in the interest of the chamber, especially if they consist of unrep-
resentative samples of legislators. Not only might appointed committees
become dominated by partisan interests, but they might also consist of
specialists whose policy concerns do not reflect those of the democratically
elected legislature.
Previous studies of committee selection have primarily focused on the
US Congress (Fenno, 1973; Smith and Deering, 1984; Weingast and Moran,
1983), although the question has also been recently examined in a number of
US state legislatures (Overby et al., 2004), the German Bundesrat (Alter, 2002)
and the Brazilian Camara dos Deputados (Santos, 2002). In this paper, I
examine committee representation in the European Parliament (EP), a legis-
lature whose committee system has steadily grown in diversity and import-
ance over the course of the past three decades. With 732 Members of the
European Parliament (MEPs) working in 20 official languages, the vast bulk
of the work of the EP falls to its system of 20 specialized committees. Most
of the activity of MEPs is concentrated in parliamentary committees, not in
the debating chamber. As is the case with the United States Congress, the
European Parliament in committee is the European Parliament at work.
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Despite the important role played by these committees, however, little
systematic work has been done investigating their overall composition. In
1995, Bowler and Farrell examined various demographic and background
characteristics of the MEPs who occupied committee positions, but they did
not look at any specific policy measures of committee composition. Further-
more, their analysis was confined to the pre-Maastricht period, before the
Parliament became fully legislative. More recent work by Whitaker (2005)
explored the voting behaviour of 12 committee contingents vis-à-vis their
national party delegations, and Kaeding (2004) and Hoyland (2006) have
examined the representative nature of the report allocation process. None-
theless, a full systematic exploration of the nature and role of EP committees
has yet to be undertaken.
In this article I examine three important issues concerning committees in
the EP. First, I examine from an empirical standpoint whether EP committees
are representative of the party group composition of the EP as a whole. Not
only has this question never before been examined in the EP, but it has also
seldom been examined in any multi-party context. From a substantive
European perspective, this investigation also queries whether the EP has
adhered to its Rules of Procedure, which dictate that ‘the composition of the
committees shall as far as possible reflect the composition of Parliament’
(European Parliament, 2004: 177.1). Second, extending the work of Bowler
and Farrell (1995), I investigate the characteristics of individual MEPs to deter-
mine whether committee members are more likely than other members to
have specialized expertise related to their committee assignments. I also
include measures of MEP ideology to test whether such specialization necess-
arily entails ideological bias. If committees are composed of MEPs with
specialist knowledge in a given area this might indicate an unrepresentative
committee in terms of ideological formation, though equally it could simply
indicate the exploitation of policy expertise by parties as an informational
asset. Finally, I compare the distribution of policy preferences of committees
with that of the EP as a whole, testing whether committees are representa-
tive not just numerically but also ideologically. The conventional wisdom
among members is that the committees are not ideologically representative
of the parent chamber. In this paper I examine the legitimacy of this belief.
This involves comparing committee and legislative median positions using
Monte Carlo simulations.
The findings suggest that, by and large, the EP committee system is indeed
representative of the Parliament as a whole. Not only is partisan balance in
committees generally proportional to party group share in the EP, but
committee seats are also proportional within countries. This proportionality is
maintained despite the fact that committees also tend to be filled by MEPs
with specialized knowledge. Despite their relatively specialized knowledge,
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however, committee members do not tend to be significantly different from
the overall legislature in their policy views, either on a general left–right
dimension or in their specific policy domains.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section briefly describes the prin-
cipal features of the EP committee system, situating it in the context of major
existing theories of legislative committee functions. The third section presents
some exploratory analysis of committee assignments in terms of party and
national representation. The fourth section examines the background charac-
teristics of MEPs who end up on particular committees. The fifth section
describes the data and methods for testing the extent of outlying committees
and presents the empirical results. Finally, the paper discusses the results and
suggests directions for future research.
The committee system of the European Parliament
Committees have played a central role in the EP from the outset. The Common
Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community, the antecedent of the
modern Parliament, recognized that committees would help alleviate the
problems inherent in coordinating work in an assembly that was scheduled
to meet in plenary only a handful of times a year. To this end, in January 1953
it created seven committees to conduct Assembly business. But it was in the
immediate aftermath of the first direct elections in 1979 that the committee
system was significantly expanded and developed as the locus of MEP
activity. Figure 1 graphically displays the expansion of the committee system
since 1979. At the same time as the membership of the Parliament expanded
from 200 to 410 members, the number of standing committees was expanded
from 12 to 15. Two further committees were added in 1981 and one more each
in 1987, 1992 and 1994. By the start of the sixth parliamentary period (July
2004) a total of 20 standing committees were in place.2 Most MEPs – 562 of
the 626 MEPs (90%) in the 1999 session – were full members on only one
committee, although some MEPs served on more than one. The average
number of committee assignments rose slightly between 1979 and 1994
(Figure 1), and there are signs of another slight increase in the newly enlarged
sixth Parliament (full details are provided in Appendix A).3 An MEP’s second
committee assignment is almost always on a ‘neutral committee’. Neutral
committees include Women’s Rights, Fisheries and Petitions and tend to be
weak, non-legislative committees. They are considered neutral because
membership does not come at the cost of a position on another committee.
Figure 1 also demonstrates that the size of committees has increased over
the past 25 years. Average committee size has risen from 31 to 43 members,
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although sizes vary significantly across committees within the same
legislative session. For instance, the current (January 2006) Legal Affairs 
Committee is composed of a mere 25 members whereas the Foreign 
Affairs Committee has 78 affiliates.
The importance of the committee system is underscored by a recent
survey of MEPs. When asked to choose their first preference from among the
EP posts of Group President, EP President, National Delegation Leader or
Committee Chair, more respondents opted for a committee chair rather than
any of the alternatives.4 MEPs clearly value committee posts and believe that
the committee system is a focal point of power that matters to the legislative
process within the EP.
Theories of legislative organization suggest that committee systems are
formed either to solve coordination problems among representatives by facili-
tating logrolling among members or to facilitate legislative efficiency (for an
overview of this literature, see Kaeding, 2004). The former distributional
approach predicts that members deliberately join committees in order to
exercise disproportionate influence over the policy areas under the
committee’s jurisdiction. Committee members share a desire for high levels
of benefit from the policies that lie within the jurisdiction of their committee
(high demand preference outliers). This results in committees that may be very
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Figure 1 Committee expansion in the European Parliament, 1979–2004.
unrepresentative of the legislature as a whole. The alternative informational
approach argues that committees are created to provide a greater number of
legislative arenas for policy development and output in legislatures that are
overburdened. This efficiency is enhanced by members’ specialization in
particular policy sub-fields. Informational theorists (Gilligan and Krehbiel,
1990; Krehbiel, 1991) dispute the degree of autonomy that the distributional
approach ascribes to committees, arguing that most legislation must pass a
majority vote on the floor of the house in order to be enacted. It is argued
that the incentives for the Parliament are to organize representative
committees as reliable sources of information. If this informational view of
committees prevails, we should not find committees that are composed of
preference outliers or committees that are more homogeneous than the Parlia-
ment as a whole (Krehbiel, 1991: 123).
Given what we know about the origins of committees in the EP, the infor-
mational approach seems initially more plausible. Legislation in the European
Union tends to be a complex, bargained outcome between multiple insti-
tutions. The Parliament has traditionally enjoyed fewer legislative powers
than the European Council, and any informational advantages developed
through committee expertise would clearly improve the bargaining power of
the EP. Such specialization was particularly important in the early days of the
Parliament when it acted as a mere consultative assembly. Informational
advantages brought about by specialization were perhaps the only means by
which it could challenge the legislative authority of the European Council.
Finally, the lack of ‘pork’ (selective goods to offer as rewards to constituents)
to distribute, coupled with the lack of strong constituency ties in European
elections, removes many of the incentives that traditionally are seen to
produce distributive gains. Together, these factors would lead us to expect to
observe the main empirical implications of the informational approach,
namely that committee membership will be highly representative of the legis-
lature and that committee members will not consist of preference outliers.
Partisan representativeness
In order to examine the overall correspondence between party strength and
committee representation in the EP, data from the last committee period in
the Fifth Parliament 2002–4 are examined. This session was chosen as the
most recent full legislative session.5 The data were compiled from the annual
Listes Grises of the European Parliament (full details in Appendix B). The
results for the two largest parties, the Party of European Socialists (PES) and
the European People’s Party (EPP), are presented in Figure 2. The horizontal
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axis represents the number of actual seats held by these parties on each of
the 17 standing committees of the Fifth Parliament, and the vertical axis is
the number of seats one would expect if committee seats were allocated
according to perfect numerical proportionality.
As is evident from this graphical representation, the proportion of party
seats on committees very closely approximates partisan strength in the Parlia-
ment. A majority of committees lie within one seat of perfect proportionality
(represented by the diagonal line). Only one committee has a PES seat
majority or deficit of greater than one seat. The EPP also has a one-seat over-
representation on only one committee, and it is underrepresented by more
than one seat on two other committees. By and large, in terms of partisan
representation there is a very close correspondence between the overall make-
up of the chamber and the committees. Analysis of the remaining five parties
in the EP at this time demonstrates similar results: parties are neither system-
atically underrepresented nor systematically overrepresented on committees.
Another issue related to proportionality concerns committee representa-
tion according to the size of national delegations. The EP Rules of Procedure
do not stipulate that committee positions should also be assigned in
proportion to national delegation strength. Nonetheless, as Figures 3 and 4
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Figure 2 Committee seat proportionality for the PES and the EPP, 2002.
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demonstrate, national proportionality does indeed seem to be the norm.
Figures 3 and 4 represent the actual and expected number of German and UK
members on the 17 standing committees for the EPP and PES in January 2002.
These two delegations were chosen because they constituted the largest
national delegations within both the PES and the EPP in the 2002–4 legisla-
tive session.
The results show a strong consistency between a strict proportionality
rule and the actual national composition of committees. Again, a large
majority of committee assignments lie within one seat of perfect proportion-
ality. Within the EPP, the German members are underrepresented on two
committees and overrepresented on two, and the UK members are overrep-
resented on just one committee. Within the PES, only the German delegation
has a deviation from perfect proportionality larger than one seat, and this on
only one committee. It would appear that, at least where party and geogra-
phy are concerned, there is a concerted effort to ensure that the committees
are microcosms of the Parliament as a whole. This evidence points to a strong
tendency to consider both partisan and national proportionality issues when
committee seats are assigned.
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Figure 3 Committee seats by national delegation: EPP, 2002.
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Committee specialization
Although the evidence indicates strongly that deliberate efforts are made to
ensure that committees are representative of legislative party seat shares,
committee members may nonetheless possess expertise or personal interests
that are not representative of the legislature as a whole. In other words,
committees may consist of specialists in particular policy areas, causing
committees to be more homogeneous than the Parliament as a whole. For
instance, MEPs with ties to farming, working within the parameters estab-
lished by the rules and norms of the EP, may be disproportionately assigned
to the Agriculture Committee. This possibility in fact reflects a widely held
belief among MEPs, expressed succinctly by a former vice-president of the
Party of European Socialists:
Committees are definitely and regrettably not representative of the Parliament in
plenary, they are not microcosms; this results in legislative distortion. The environ-
mentally minded from all groups are on the Environment committee, giving it a
distinctly green outlook; likewise there are too many farmers on Agriculture. The
result of this specialization and lack of representativeness is that policy is not
reflective of the majority view of the Parliament and we frequently have to spend
hours in Parliament voting to correct the committee report and proposed legis-
lation. (Personal interview)
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Figure 4 Committee seats by national delegation: PES, 2002.
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Another Labour MEP similarly commented: ‘The problem with the EP is that
Agriculture is full of farmers, the Environment of greens, Legal Affairs of
lawyers, Foreign Affairs of ex-ministers; we need a better balance on
committees, not a bunch of specialists.’ In this section I examine the evidence
for this type of specialized committee membership.
Of course, finding evidence of specialization is not sufficient proof that
committees are composed of outliers or high demanders, since such evidence
is also consistent with the expectations of informational theories. It may be
in the interest of party leaders and the Parliament as a legislative institution
to appoint specialists to a committee. Interview evidence also suggests that
this is not an inaccurate characterization of the assignment process. One junior
member of the European Liberal Democrat and Reform (ELDR) group
commented:
I was convinced by the party leadership to take a position on the Industry
Committee because of my background. I was really not so inclined myself but
they felt it would strengthen the bargaining position of the party as we have only
got five members on this particular committee. (Personal interview)
On the other hand, if there is no evidence of specialization, this could
indicate that the assignment process is either random or based on different
criteria, such as wanting the committee to include members with a broad
spectrum of experience, not just those with policy expertise in the field.
Specialization may indicate that committees are composed of high deman-
ders, in keeping with a distribution theory of committee systems, but equally
it may simply indicate that parties actively and knowingly exploit the policy
knowledge of their members for efficiency reasons. Essentially, it is difficult
to interpret the full implications of finding or not finding policy experts on a
committee.
Using data from the 1999–2004 legislature, I test the hypothesis that there
is some degree of specialization in the actual assignment process for the two
largest political groups, the European People’s Party and the Party of the
European Socialists. In contrast to Bowler and Farrell (1995), I analyse the
political groups separately. This approach is superior because if the assign-
ment process is largely in proportion to party strength – as demonstrated in
the previous section – then statistical evidence of specialization may be atten-
uated if we include all parties in one equation. For instance, if there are no
farmers in the ranks of the PES (as is largely the case) and they have to take
the second-largest portion of seats on the Agriculture Committee, the absence
of farmers from their ranks would indicate that there is less specialization
than might be possible if they had farmers to choose from, whereas the EPP
may actually put all its many farmers on this committee. In addition, the
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assignment process need not necessarily work in the same fashion in each
party.
The dependent variable is actual committee assignment at the beginning
of the Fifth Parliament (July 1999). In particular, I examine the assignment
process to the Legal Affairs Committee, the Environment and Public Health
Committee, and the Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and
Energy (Industry). These three committees vary in their overall influence on
policy. The Environment and Industry committees are two of the most
powerful in the EP, whereas the Legal Affairs Committee is somewhat less
prestigious. If there is specialization, we would expect members with a back-
ground in law to be attracted to the Legal Affairs Committee, and MEPs with
links to environmental groups or medicine to be particularly attracted to the
Environment Committee. Similarly, MEPs with links to big business and
industry should be drawn to the Industry Committee. As control variables, I
have included measures of the demographic and ideological characteristics
policy experience and seniority of MEPs.
Information on the background characteristics of MEPs was culled from
a variety of sources, including the Times Guide to the European Parliament (e.g.
Morgan, 1994), Handbook of the European People’s Party (CD-Group) of the
European Parliament (European People’s Party, 2001), The Members of the
European Parliament 1999–2004 (European Parliament, 2001) and the personal
websites of MEPs.
MEP seniority is operationalized in two ways. The variable Years Served
captures the concept of deference to long-serving members of the Parliament,
and simply measures the number of years that the MEP has served in the EP.6
Slightly less than 55% of EPP members were freshmen in 1999, and only 7%
of members had served more than 10 years. The comparable statistics for the
PES are 43% and 11%. The second measure of seniority is Committee Previ-
ously, a dichotomous variable that measures whether the member served on
this particular committee in the previous Parliament. Of returning EPP
members, for instance, 67% served on the same committee that they had been
on in the previous Parliament. The demographic variables include Gender and
Age, which is measured in years. The median age for the EPP members was
52 years, and in the PES it was one year lower at 51. Slightly over one-third
of PES members were women, compared with just over a quarter of EPP
members.
The policy expertise variables vary for the committee under consider-
ation. Legal captures whether the member was a lawyer, judge, law lecturer
or former minister of justice at the national level. Almost 20% of EPP MEPs
had some connection to the legal profession, compared with 13% of PES
members. Industry is coded 1 if the member had ties to industry, was a trade
McElroy Committee Representation in the European Parliament 1 5
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Table 1 Logistic regression of EPP and PES committee assignments, 1999
EPP PES
———————————————————————————— ——————————————————————————————–
Environment & Environment &
Legal Affairs Public Health Industry Legal Affairs Public Health Industry 
Variable Committee Committee Committee Committee Committee Committee
Ideology 1.51 –0.67 1.01 0.96 1.10 1.71
(5.8) (2.02) (1.75) (1.74) (7.97) (6.5)
Years Served –0.05 –0.37** –0.05 –0.03 –0.06 0.04
(0.06) (0.15) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06)
Committee Previously 3.09** 4.8** 4.94** 3.92** 4.70** 2.89**
(1.20) (2.67) (1.01) (1.34) (0.73) (0.84)
Age –0.003 –0.005 0.04 0.01 –0.02 0.03
(0.02) (0.032) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Gender –0.13 1.45** –0.40 –0.89 1.61* 0.34
(0.56) (0.63) (0.72) (0.92) (0.74) (0.64)
Green Ties 1.86* 1.98*
(1.0) (1.1)
Medicine 2.54** 3.47**
(0.84) (1.12)
Industry 0.71 1.77**
(0.71) (0.68)
Legal 1.42** 1.50**
(0.58) (0.60)
Constant –1.35 –2.40 –3.95 –4.17* –3.46 –0.70
(2.35) (2.14) (2.0) (2.18) (3.3) (2.8)
–2LL 108.8 85.8 101.4 99.6 71.4 85.6
N 170 224 224 224 170 170
Data sources: EP: Medlemsfortegnelse over Praesidiet, Parlamentet, de Politiske Grupper og Udvalgene (1994, 1999); The Times Guide to the European Parliament (1994); Dod’s European
Companion (1999); Handbook of the European People’s Party (2000).
Note: Figures in parentheses represent standard errors.
*significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 10% level.
unionist, owned his or her own company or was a former minister of industry
at the national level. In the EPP, 14% of members had ties to industry or
labour. In the PES, a similar proportion (12%) had ties to industry, largely
through trade unions. Green Ties is coded 1 if the member ever had ties to
green groups such as Friends of the Earth or Greenpeace, or was a former
minister of the environment at the national level. There were very few such
ties in either party: fewer than 4% in either case. Medical is a dichotomous
variable coded 1 if the member is or was in the medical profession or a former
minister of health at the national level.
The final independent variable, Ideology, measures the MEPs’ ideological
preferences. This measure is taken from the standard first-dimension W-
NOMINATE scores derived by Hix et al. (2005) for members in the Fifth
Parliament, the only currently available measure of MEP ideological prefer-
ences. These scores measure the MEP left–right placement on a –1.0 to +1.0
scale, estimated from roll-call votes using techniques of multidimensional
scaling (a more detailed discussion of the use of the NOMINATE scores is
presented in the next section).
Table 1 displays logistic regression estimates of committee membership
for the three committees under examination for both main political groups.
A positive coefficient for an independent variable implies that changing the
value of the independent variable from 0 to 1 increases the probability of
obtaining an assignment on this committee (and obviously the reverse for
negative coefficients). For example, a positive coefficient on Medical would
mean that, holding all other values at their mean, members with a background
in medicine are more likely to receive such an assignment.
A quick look at Table 1 confirms that the results are largely consistent
with a specialization hypothesis. There are predictable patterns in the selec-
tion of MEPs onto committees. MEPs with a medical background or links to
environmental groups are more likely to be on the Environment and Public
Health Committee. Lawyers end up on the Legal Affairs Committee, just as
those with links to industry end up on the Industry Committee. For each of
the committees in question, occupational and interest groups ties are in the
expected direction and, with the exception of the EPP delegation to the
Industry Committee, all are statistically significant. In addition, previous
tenure on a committee is highly significant for both parties for all of the three
committees. In other words, both expertise and experience matter for the
assignment of MEPs to committee positions. These results contrast with those
of Bowler and Farrell (1995), indicating here that there is strong evidence in
support of a seniority norm operating in the EP. These divergent findings may
be a product of the different time period under consideration, since the EP is
considerably more professionalized than it was even a decade ago. It may
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also be a result of methodological choices in the modelling process, since
analysing political groups separately makes a difference. Interestingly, for
both political parties Gender is significant for the Environment and Public
Health Committee: female MEPs are more likely to be assigned to this
committee than are their male counterparts. Ideology is not significant for
either of the parties for any of the committees under consideration. This result
suggests that party representatives on a committee are not ideologically
different from their co-partisans.7
There is thus clear evidence of specialization in the assignment process
in the European Parliament. It is not possible to infer from these results,
however, whether these patterns reflect a process of self-selection on the part
of the members, or whether the party chooses to place policy specialists on
the Legal Affairs, Environment and Industry committees. In other words, it
is not clear if the assignment process is driven by the collective needs of the
party for expertise or by self-selecting homogeneous high demanders. None
of this actually speaks to whether or not the median policy preference on a
committee is different from that of the floor. The next section directly explores
this question by testing whether committees are representative of the full
chamber in terms of their distribution of policy preferences.
Policy representativeness
Evidence of specialization cannot prove that a committee’s members share a
common policy outlook or commitment to high levels of benefits from policies
within the jurisdiction of their particular committee. The precise nature of this
committee–floor interaction is a topic that has long occupied scholars of
Congress, and a voluminous literature is devoted to testing the degree to
which committees are outlying in general left–right terms and, to a lesser
extent, in their own policy jurisdictions. The work of Weingast and Marshall
(1988) and Londregan and Snyder (1994) have found that the committees of
the US Congress are predominantly unrepresentative in nature. However,
these results have been hotly contested by Krehbiel (1991) and Groseclose
(1994), amongst others. In this paper I extend this debate beyond the US case
by exploring the floor–committee relationship in the EP. Using original data
on committee assignments and members’ ideal points, and using a variety of
statistical techniques and Monte Carlo simulations, I test the degree to which
committees are composed of preference outliers.
To test whether or not committees are composed of preference outliers,
we need a measure of MEP preferences. Unfortunately, true preferences are
inherently unobservable. Unlike the case of the US Congress, we have no
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established independent interest group ratings for individual members of the
EP.8 One must therefore use data on MEP behaviour to infer policy prefer-
ences. One such means of locating member preferences is to use their voting
record in plenary. In this paper I use the W-NOMINATE (Poole and Rosen-
thal, 1991) procedure to locate members of the European Parliament in multi-
dimensional Euclidean space. The NOMINATE procedure is essentially a
scaling algorithm that was developed in the context of the US Congress and
has been applied with considerable success in this arena. NOMINATE extracts
n-common factors that characterize a multidimensional policy space and
provides measures of the explanatory power of these factors. This method of
estimation does not take into account either the political affiliation of the legis-
lator or the nature of the vote.
The use of NOMINATE scores is not without problems, especially as not
all votes in the European Parliament are subject to roll calls. In the last legis-
lature, for instance, roll calls represented only about one-third of all votes
(Hix, 2001: 667). Roll-call votes thus do not provide a complete picture of
MEP voting behaviour. The decision to call a roll-call vote may be a strate-
gic action. The political groups in the EP call roll-call votes and there is some
suggestion that they may be biased towards the groups that call them
(Carrubba and Gabel, 1999). Nevertheless, there is no evidence to suggest
that roll-call votes are called disproportionately on particular policy issues,
or by particular political groups or under particular legislative procedures.
Thus, in the absence of a better proxy for members’ preferences and given
that NOMINATE is the standard method used in legislative studies for
estimating ideal points of members of assemblies, I will work on the assump-
tion that they are a reasonable, though imperfect, approximation of
members’ preferences.
The tests applied in this section address the question of whether or not
the committees of the European Parliament are composed of preference
outliers, examined at four different time points from July 1989 to June 1999.
The EP is an institution in the process of defining itself and its powers have
increased dramatically since the first direct elections. It is therefore import-
ant not to generalize from findings at one point in time to the entire history
of the Parliament. It may very well be the case that parties did not care about
the question of preference outliers when the Parliament was restricted in its
legislative abilities but that the matter may now be a pressing concern. I there-
fore examine all of the committees separately at each time point, bearing in
mind Fenno’s (1973: 280) entreaty that ‘committees differ from one another’.
In the European Parliament there is a stark divide between legislative and
non-legislative committees and this may be significant. The chamber may not
care much about the representative nature of the non-legislative Fisheries
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Committee, but it might be deeply concerned about having an Environment
Committee that is not a true microcosm of Parliament.
My estimation includes all votes for the two committee periods 1989–92
and 1992–4 and a random sample of 1500 votes for the 1994–6 and 1997–9
committee terms. NOMINATE scores are estimated separately for each of the
four committee terms under examination. Following Poole and Rosenthal
(1991) for each of these legislative periods, I include every legislator who casts
at least 25 votes. In addition, I excluded votes where less than 3% of those
voting voted against the majority. Using first-dimension NOMINATE scores,
I test whether committees are composed of outliers or whether they can be
deemed representative of the chamber as a whole. The first dimension
explains over 80% of total vote decisions during each time period. The
average proportional reduction in error (APRE) for the first dimension is over
60% in each case; adding the second dimension reduces the errors by approx-
imately 10% more.9 These percentages reflect similar findings in the US
Congress. Poole and Rosenthal (1997) found that, in the first 100 Congresses,
the average two-dimensional classifications were 85% and the average APRE
was 0.56 for two dimensions.
Interpretation of the meaning of these dimensions is admittedly subjec-
tive. But, for each of the four committee terms, the first dimension very closely
approximates the left–right dimension of national politics. Each of the politi-
cal groups is in correct alignment with classic left–right expectations, with the
European United Left and Green groupings on the far left and the Group for
a Europe of Democracies and Diversities on the far right in 1999. This
interpretation is consonant with recent analysis conducted by Hix (2001) and
Hix et al. (2005). McElroy and Benoit (forthcoming) offer independent verifi-
cation that the first dimension of competition in the European Parliament is
a classic left–right one through analysis of an expert survey of political group
positions.
W-NOMINATE scores are not directly comparable across legislatures, but
this is not problematic here because the measures of central tendency in any
given committee period are examined only relative to chamber medians and
means at each time point. Formal models suggest that studies of committee
representativeness should focus on the position of the median legislator when
exploring issues of central tendency (Black, 1958). Others use the mean as the
appropriate test (Krehbiel, 1991). The latter is more sensitive to outlying obser-
vations and thus increases the odds of finding outlying committees. I there-
fore use both means and medians to test whether or not the committees are
outlying, since this analysis represents the first systematic look at this
question in the EP and I am interested in finding any evidence to support the
hypothesis of unrepresentative committees.
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The standard method for testing for difference of means is the basic t-
test. However, this method has its drawbacks because it relies on certain
distributional assumptions, in particular that the data are normally distrib-
uted. To test for difference in medians, one can use a non-parametric method
such as a Mann–Whitney test, but the power of this test is relatively low and
it makes the additional assumption that the data are symmetric. In order to
provide tests for outlying committees without relying on these strong distri-
butional assumptions, I utilize the non-parametric Groseclose (1994) Monte
Carlo technique, which makes use of actual distributions to examine to what
degree a committee is more outlying than a randomly selected committee
would be. Essentially, this method compares the distribution of actual
committees with simulated committees drawn from the full chamber. I
perform Monte Carlo simulations for each committee for each two-and-a-half-
year committee term.
Using the list of members in each Parliament and their NOMINATE
scores, I created 10,000 simulated committees of the precise size of the actual
committee under consideration. For instance, to simulate the selection of the
Political Affairs Committee (PAC) in 1989, 54 members are selected (without
replacement) from the complete list of MEPs and the median and mean scores
for this random committee are then calculated. This process is repeated 10,000
times, and the distribution of the means and medians from the randomly
selected committees is compared with the mean and median of the actual
PAC. From this distribution of 10,000 medians one can examine what percent-
age of random committees are as outlying as the PAC. Looking at the second
column of Table 2, we can see that, of the simulated committees, a proportion
of .277 were equally as outlying as the actual PAC, i.e. they had a median
score that was equal to or greater than that of the PAC. With a standard thresh-
old of .05 as our test statistic, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
committee is randomly assigned. A similar test is conducted for means. The
results are presented in column 3 in Table 2 and we see that .289 random
committees had a mean as outlying as that of the PAC.
As can be seen easily from Table 2 and Table 3, the proportion of
committees that are as outlying is rarely less than 5%. Looking at simulated
medians, we see that in 1989 only the ‘neutral’ Budgetary Control Committee
meets this criterion.
For the remaining three committee periods, the random hypothesis can
be rejected only once – for the Social Affairs and Employment Committee in
1997–9. Looking at simulated means, we note that the null is rejected only
once over the course of the four committee periods under examination, once
again for the Budgetary Control Committee in 1992–4. The empirical evidence
is hence overwhelmingly in favour of representative committees. There are
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Table 2 Preference outliers 1989–94 based on NOMINATE scores
1989–92 1992–4
———————————————————— ———————————————————–
Simulated Simulated Committee Simulated Simulated Committee 
Committee median p mean p size median p mean p size
Political Affairs .227 .289 54 .307 .332 55
Agriculture, Fisheries, Rural Development .088 .285 47 .444 .473 45
Budgets .211 .284 32 .186 .284 28
Economic & Monetary Affairs, Industrial Policy .406 .248 50 .492 .467 47
Energy, Research & Technology .095 .167 32 .390 .427 30
External Economic Relations .454 .275 27 .433 .320 24
Legal Affairs & Citizens’ Rights .471 .293 32 .308 .294 27
Social Affairs & Employment .363 .139 41 .112 .357 37
Regional Policy and Regional Planning .106 .062 34 .442 .488 34
Transport and Tourism . 070 .083 28 .391 .487 29
Environment, Public Health & Consumer Protection .183 .324 52 .479 .327 48
Youth, Culture, Education, the Media & Sport .206 .244 30 .464 .229 30
Development & Cooperation .474 .259 43 .180 .283 37
Budgetary Control .010 .136 28 .128 .045 22
Institutional Affairs .430 .489 34 .371 .357 34
Rules of Procedure & Verifications of Credentials .422 .326 26 .464 .387 24
and Immunities
Women’s Rights .386 .326 33 .234 .160 28
Petitions .253 .235 24 .403 .343 23
Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs .356 .499 28
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Table 3 Preference Outliers 1994–9 based on NOMINATE scores
1994–6 1997–9
———————————————————— ———————————————————–
Simulated Simulated Committee Simulated Simulated Committee 
Committee median p mean p size median p mean p size
Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy .464 .495 52 .434 .397 65
Agriculture & Rural Development .181 .197 46 .192 .127 45
Budgets .461 .376 34 .362 .384 40
Economic & Monetary Affairs, Industrial Policy .457 .480 52 .389 .374 59
Research,Technological Development and Energy .345 .269 28 .399 .435 33
External Economic Relations .278 .333 25 .233 .303 23
Legal Affairs & Citizens’ Rights .325 .392 25 .298 .309 26
Social Affairs & Employment .459 .430 42 .015 .111 47
Regional Policy .493 .366 37 .416 .443 43
Transport and Tourism .400 .389 35 .456 .387 40
Environment, Public Health & Consumer Protection .427 .273 44 .378 .298 51
Culture, Youth, Education & the Media .297 .439 36 .260 .369 39
Development & Cooperation .497 .464 35 .378 .440 39
Budgetary Control .397 .390 24 .341 .295 26
Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs .242 .254 32 .279 .282 32
Institutional Affairs .420 .445 39 .397 .261 37
Rules of Procedure & Verifications of Credentials .373 .309 23 .331 .374 25
and Immunities
Fisheries .413 .374 22 .434 .366 25
Women’s Rights .204 .201 36 .189 .147 39
Petitions .467 .396 26 .488 .424 31
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Table 4 Preference outliers based on policy-specific measures
1989–92 1994–6
———————————————————— ———————————————————–
Simulated Simulated Committee Simulated Simulated Committee 
Committee median p mean p size median p mean p size
Environment, Public Health & Consumer Protection .348 .335 50 .354 .063 42
Economic & Monetary Affairs, Industrial Policy .345 .251 46 .337 .226 44
Agriculture & Rural Development .283 .283 46 .281 .119 39
External Economic Relations .450 .351 24 .157 .247 22
Social Affairs & Employment .375 .267 34 .325 .012 39
few, if any, systematic differences between committees and the Parliament as
a whole in terms of the classic left–right dimension.
As a final test, setting the bar even higher for the representative
committee hypothesis, I also examined whether the committees are outliers
in terms of their own specific policy domains. For example, is the Environ-
ment Committee off-centre in terms of ‘green’ issues? Testing this hypothesis
requires policy-specific ratings for each Member of Parliament. To obtain
these, I have used a random sample of (for instance) environmental votes to
arrive at ideal points for each member on an environmental policy dimen-
sion. Table 4 presents the results of Monte Carlo simulations on these data
using the methods outlined in the previous section in five different policy
domains: Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection; Economic
and Monetary Affairs, Industrial Policy; Agriculture and Rural Development;
External Economic Relations; and Social Affairs and Employment.
As is clear from the table, there is little evidence for committees being
policy outliers even within their own specific domains. With the exception of
the Social Affairs and Employment Committee in 1994, not a single committee
is outlying in terms of simulated committee distributions in either of the two
time periods examined (1989–92 and 1994–96). The Social Affairs and
Employment Committee is outlying in terms only of its mean and not of the
standard measure of central tendency, the median. The results weigh quite
heavily against the distributional theory expectation that committees should
be composed of preference outliers.10
Discussion
In this article I have sought to offer a comparative angle on the committee
outlier debate. The analysis found no evidence to suggest that committees in
the European Parliament are unrepresentative of their parent chamber. In the
vast majority of cases, committee assignments in the EP lead to committees
that are largely comparable with the larger legislature. In partisan, national
and ideological terms, there does not appear to be any systematic departure
from the principle of proportionality in the assignment of committee posi-
tions in the European Parliament. This finding holds for both legislative and
non-legislative committees and over time. In short, there is simply no
evidence to suggest that there is any systematic bias in committee assign-
ments in the EP. Despite conventional wisdom, the Environment Committee
is no more left-wing or green than the Assembly taken as a whole.
Evidence for outlying committees is absent; the few cases found could
easily have been produced by random error. Indeed, we would expect, in a
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chamber with 20 committees, to reject the null erroneously at least once (20
* 0.05 = 1). It is not clear if this lack of outliers is the result of a random
assignment process or the product of conscious behaviour on the part of party
leaders. Nonetheless, the evidence is certainly consistent with a story of party
leadership consciously making an effort to create representative committees.
These findings are particularly interesting in light of the work of Kaeding
(2004) and Hoyland (in this issue), which suggests that the allocation of actual
reports within committees is not representative of the chamber as a whole.
The analysis of ideological representativeness has relied on NOMINATE
scores estimated from roll-call votes, a procedure that is not free of shortcom-
ings. The selectivity of roll-call votes in the EP, for instance, may mean that
these votes do not portray the full spectrum of policy preferences or are called
on strategically unrepresentative issues. In addition to the problems of errors
in measurement, the use of roll-call votes may bias results towards the null
(Hall and Grofman, 1990). To validate some of the findings, one possible
avenue for future research is to find some alternative measures of off-centred-
ness. Two that suggest themselves use data on amendments in plenary. First,
does plenary accept amendments from the reporting committee at the first
and second readings? If these are rejected, it would provide some indication
that the committee opinion is not representative of the larger assembly.
Secondly, how many amendments does the chamber add? For example, does
plenary add a disproportionate number of amendments to reports coming
from the Environment Committee? This might indicate that the Parliament
was not satisfied with the final wording of the Environment report.
This first look at the representativeness of EP committees has left many
important questions to be further explored. In particular, the role of political
groups in the process of committee assignment needs to be examined in
greater detail. Do political leaders consciously choose contingents that result
in representative committees, or are representative committees a product of
random assignment facilitated by the parliamentary rules and norms? Given
the very high transfer rates (upwards of 30%) between committees from one
committee term to the next, the question arises of whether this reflects choice
on the part of individual MEPs or, rather, an opportunity by party leaders to
change the composition of committees.
This analysis represents a first step in examining the committee system
of the European Parliament, and there is great scope for future analysis.
Noting these caveats, the results presented here suggest that the assignment
process in the European Parliament is more consonant with the informational
model of politics.
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Notes
I thank Robert Elgie, Christian Grose, G. Bingham Powell and three anonymous
reviewers for very helpful comments at various stages of this research. I especi-
ally thank Kenneth Benoit for feedback on earlier drafts. In addition, I acknowl-
edge the generosity of Simon Hix, Gérard Roland and Abdul Noury in sharing
their roll-call data through the European Parliamentary Research Group and the
various Members of the European Parliament who kindly consented to be inter-
viewed for the project.
1 In conversation with the author.
2 This number was temporarily reduced to 17 in the Fifth Parliament
(1999–2004) but attempts by the Party of European Socialists to reduce the
number of standing committees even further were not successful. There have
been calls to expand the number of committees with each enlargement of the
Parliament. The creation of subcommittees and temporary committees has
somewhat alleviated the pressure for further enlargement of the system.
3 The Appendices to this article are to be found on the EUP webpage.
4 Of the respondents, 37% opted for committee chair as their first preference,
compared with 27% opting for what would ostensibly seem to be the most
prestigious parliamentary post, the presidency of the Parliament. Only 18%
opted for leading their national delegation and 17% opted for leadership of
their political group (Hix and Scully, 2000).
5 This period is not unrepresentative; similar results have been produced for
the full period 1992–2004 but are not presented here for reasons of space.
They are available from the author upon request.
6 Bowler and Farrell (1995: 240) argue that seniority is irrelevant. Nonetheless,
there is evidence from interviews with senior party leaders that seniority is
not irrelevant. High-profile committees such as Foreign Affairs and Legal
Affairs have a much higher number of returning MEPs than do low-prestige
committees such as Culture or Regional Policy.
7 Cox and McCubbins (1993) offer a third theory of committee composition,
which predicts that the majority party controls the assignment of its party
members to committees with ‘uniform externalities’. However, committees
with targeted externalities may be unrepresentative. It is unclear which
committees, if any, in the EP have targeted externalities and which have
uniform and mixed externalities. Here, all I can say is that the party contin-
gents are representative of their parent party on the committees examined
for the PES and EPP.
8 The very first attempts to produce Interest Group scores for the EP took place
only in 2004, when Friends of the Earth produced a scale deeming MEPs to
be either for or against environment legislation on the basis of a sample of
key votes.
9 The APRE is defined as follows:
APRE =
∑ (minority vote – NOMINATE classification errors)
∑ minority vote
10 Standard t-tests and the Mann–Whitney difference of medians test on the data
revealed few outlying committees either. The results are available on request
from the author.
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